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Postcommunist States of Central and Eastern Europe (Dordrecht, Springer 2005)
377 p., ISBN 1402030061
Systems of unlimited parliamentary supremacy are now the exception rather than
the rule in the West. The growth of constitutional review has had a favourable
effect on the fortunes of academic constitutional lawyers. In Germany, constitu-
tional scholarship has even adopted the Federal Constitutional Court as a sort of
junior partner. Sadurski dismisses as sheer speculation the claim that the Euro-
pean Union expected the candidate countries to set-up a system of constitutional
courts that would be in a very strong position vis-à-vis the legislatures (42). How-
ever, the fact is that the ‘importation’ of constitutional review in Central and
Eastern Europe was not accompanied by any serious reflection upon the implica-
tions of such a system. For that reason, the development of constitutional courts
in this region is a fascinating subject for constitutionalists. After the eastward
enlargement of the European Union, the new ‘constitutional traditions’ can influ-
ence the constitutional rights of all the citizens of the European Union.
In this book, Sadurski addresses important questions: Why has the democratic
legitimacy of constitutional courts in Central and Eastern Europe been taken for
granted? What effects have the former communist regimes had on the constitu-
tions and constitutional courts in Central and Eastern Europe? Has this led to the
widespread cynical conviction that politics is a dirty business? How have these
countries come to terms with their communist leaders and deeds of the past? How
political is the power of constitutional interpretation? In addition, is there any
truth to the claim that the judiciary is ill equipped to evaluate opinions and choices
regarding socio-economic policies with financial implications? To deal with all of
these questions, Sadurski presents a wealth of case studies.
Rights before Courts is a highly informative and very rich book. Sadurski’s main
focus is on Poland and Hungary; however, his analysis also encompasses the sys-
tems in Albania, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia-Montenegro,
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Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. It is apparent that some of their constitutional
courts, for instance the Hungarian Constitutional Court, function more like an
upper house of parliament or ‘chamber of reflection’. Constitutional courts are
able to escape the social criticism endured by other political and legislative institu-
tions thanks to their ability to draw upon the appearance of neutrality enjoyed by
courts in general. Sadurski concentrates his attention on the institutional rela-
tions between the legislative, executive and judicial branches and the role these
constitutional courts play in clarifying the meaning of the principles of the sepa-
ration of powers and the electoral system. Sadurksi correctly stresses that if the
role of constitutional courts is to be maintained, their legitimacy must be estab-
lished by means of argument. His reflections on constitutionalism and legal theory
are always to the point. In this book, he pays particular attention to the question
of how effectively constitutional courts articulate and protect citizens’ rights. He
also addresses those cases in which legislative articulations of constitutional rights
have been set aside and invalidated as unconstitutional.
In Part I of the book, Chapters 1-4, the author concentrates on the ‘legitimacy
dilemma’ of the constitutional courts. Under Communism, there was a universal
rejection of constitutional review, which was seen as inconsistent with the prin-
ciple of the supremacy of parliament and, of course, incompatible with the total
political control exercised by the Communist Party. Sadurski offers an overview of
the structure, the functions and the composition of constitutional courts. The
type of review established by the courts in most countries is that of a ‘concen-
trated’ or ‘centralized’ constitutional review, conducted by a court composed of
judges appointed for a limited tenure by the political branches of government.
These judges conduct an abstract, ex post and final review of the constitutionality
of statutes and other ‘infra-constitutional’ acts. Accordingly, there is no right of
appeal with regard to the constitutional court’s decision. Abstract judicial review
is the method of considering the textual dimension of the statutory rule rather
than its effect in application to real people and actual legal controversies. Most of
the constitutional courts in the region also exercise the power of concrete review
initiated by other courts. The other courts are obliged to suspend proceedings and
address their query to the constitutional court when faced with doubts as to the
constitutionality of a law about to be applied in the case before them.
In Central and Eastern Europe, the relationship between the constitutional
courts and the legislature can become strained on occasion when these courts act
not only as a ‘negative legislature’ but also a ‘co-legislature’ or even a major player
in the law-making process, by rewriting the laws themselves (this applies in par-
ticular to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia) (104). However, in
general, the constitutional courts in Central and Eastern Europe do not suffer
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from substantial legitimacy problems. Since the fall of Communism, a communis
opinio among constitutional lawyers in Central and Eastern Europe seems to be
that, were it not for the constitutional court, the tyranny of the majority would be
the norm. By approaching the study of courts from a political science perspective,
one can only conclude that this vision of the constitutional courts as some kind of
bulwark against the tyranny of majority rule does not prove right in many cases
(61). For instance, in Estonia and Latvia, with their large Russian-speaking mi-
norities, the constitutional courts played a minimal role in imposing a regime
designed to accommodate the Russians. In Poland, the Constitutional Tribunal
caved in to pressure from the Catholic Church by invalidating the country’s lib-
eral abortion law, upholding the introduction of religious teaching in public schools
and the Broadcasting Act’s ban on expressions offensive to Christian values.
Discussions about judicial review usually focus on the question of legitimacy:
is it legitimate for non-elected judges to frustrate the will of the democratically
accountable representatives of the people and overturn their legislative choices? A
conceptually and politically distinct question is whether judicial review helps to
protect individual rights. There are some prudential reasons to support judicial
review if the institutional particularities of judicial institutions, compared with
those of the political branches, render courts more sensitive to individual rights.
However, the author stresses that this view cannot be validated in abstraction
from the particular circumstances in a particular country. In Part II, Chapters 5-
10, Sadurski gives a presentation of basic rights as interpreted by constitutional
courts in the region. To establish whether the gains of judicial review exceed the
losses from a rights-protection perspective, the author presents a ‘score card’ of
rights-enhancing decisions (gains) versus rights-weakening decisions (losses)
brought about either by invalidating or upholding legislation (116). He examines
key constitutional court cases dealing with personal, civil and political rights, socio-
economic rights and equality and minority rights, and consistently relates these
cases to the constitution and political system of the state in question while provid-
ing illuminating links to examples in other countries in the region.
In the end, Sadurski does not convincingly prove, as he sets out to do, that a
system of strong judicial review of statutes has a negative effect on the public; that
it bolsters the perception of rights discourse as an obscure activity reserved for
lawyers.
While failing to give the reader a clear account of the methods used for data
collection and interviews with judges, Sadurski still argues compellingly that the
record of constitutional courts in the region is far from unambiguously positive
(289). Of course, political systems should be structured in such a way as to pre-
vent the abuse of power by those whose duty it is to enact and execute laws. The
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objective is a government of laws, and not of men. However, separating powers by
separating persons is not the end of the problem. Sadurski shows that opportuni-
ties to strike down objectionable laws have been missed, and there have even been
cases where rights-protection laws have been invalidated, and the legal regime
pushed into a less liberal direction. There have also been cases where the courts
substituted their own choices and preferences for those of the political branches of
government.
Judicial review seems necessary to check the operation of the majority prin-
ciple, without invalidating its ultimate authority. Because of the relation between
the principle of separation of powers and the concept of government by law, the
judiciary should not exercise legislative and executive powers. When the branches
of government are independent from each other, there is always the risk of their
standing aloof from the people. In fact, all three powers need a degree of popular
control. Sadurski is very convincing when he concludes that the existence of judi-
cial review comes at a price. To him, therefore, it is only proper that the constitu-
tional courts be subject to stricter scrutiny than has been the case thus far, both
from within their constitutional context and from society at large. For constitu-
tional law scholars, the eastward enlargement of the European Union should be a
good start in this respect.
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